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SCOTT v. PACIFIC WEST MOUNTAIN RESORT: ERRONEOUSLY
INVALIDATING PARENTAL RELEASES OF A MINOR'S
FUTURE CLAIM
Angeline Purdy
Abstract: In Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, the Washington Supreme Court held
that parents do not have legal authority to waive their children's future claims for personal
injuries caused by a third party's negligence. This Note argues that the court departed
from Washington precedent and ignored the implications of existing Washington law.
Moreover, the court erroneously analogized children's future claims to children's existing
claims by failing to adequately analyze the differences between the two situations. This
Note thus concludes that because parents can already waive their children's causes of
action in many situations, they should be allowed to do so through preinjury releases.
In Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort,1 the Washington Supreme
Court held that a parent cannot waive her child's future cause of
action against a third party for personal injuries. Although the court
concluded that parental preinjury releases violate public policy, it
failed to apply established Washington precedent. This Note analyzes
the Scott court's reasoning and argues that the court improperly inval-
idated the release and that the decision is inconsistent with Washing-
ton law regarding both express assumption of risk and parental
management of children's claims.
Part I of this Note sets forth the Scott opinion as it relates to paren-
tal waivers of children's personal injury claims. Part II examines
Washington law on express assumption of risk and the Scott court's
failure to apply this precedent. Part III discusses the inconsistencies
between the Scott court's concern for injured children's ability to
recover and the practical effects of existing Washington law, which
already allows parents to control their children's claims. Finally, part
IV compares the considerations underlying parental management of
children's existing claims and children's future claims and concludes
that the Scott court erroneously equated the two situations.
1. 119 Wash. 2d 484, 834 P.2d 6 (1992).
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I. SCOTT v. PACIFIC WEST- THE WASHINGTON SUPREME
COURT INVALIDATES PARENTAL PREINJURY
RELEASES
Justin Scott, age twelve, wanted to take ski racing lessons at Gray-
son Connor Ski School.' The ski school required that one of his par-
ents sign an application containing the following language:
For and in consideration of the instruction of skiing, I hereby hold
harmless Grayson Connor, and the Grayson Connor Sid School and any
instructor or chaperon from all claims arising out of the instruction of
skiing or in transit to or from the ski area. I accept full responsibility for
the cost of treatment for any injury suffered while taking part in the
program.3
Justin's mother, with Justin's father's knowledge, signed the
application.4
After enrolling, Justin attempted to ski on a slalom race course laid
out by the ski school owner and suffered severe head injuries when he
left the course and collided with an unused rope-tow shack.5 Follow-
ing Justin's accident, Justin and his parents sued the ski school, alleg-
ing that the school improperly prepared the race course and
negligently placed it too close to the shack.6 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the ski school based on the release Mrs. Scott
signed, and the Scotts appealed the decision.7 The Washington
Supreme Court granted their petition for direct review.'
The supreme court addressed two questions regarding the Scotts'
claim against the ski school: whether the application clearly conveyed
the ski school's intent to limit its liability and whether a parent has the
legal authority to waive a child's future cause of action for personal
injuries resulting from a third party's negligence.9 Addressing the
first issue, the court held that the language of the application ade-
quately notified Mrs. Scott that the ski school intended to disclaim all
2. Id. at 487-88, 834 P.2d at 8.
3. Id. at 488, 834 P.2d at 8.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Justin and his parents also sued Pacific West Mountain Resort, the owner of the ski
resort where the injury occurred. Id. This Note addresses only issues pertaining to the ski
school.
7. Id. at 489, 834 P.2d at 9.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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liability for its negligent conduct.1 ° With respect to the second issue,
the court held that granting a parent the authority to waive a child's
future claim against a third party for negligence violates public pol-
icy. t" Thus, the court concluded that a parent's signature on a
preinjury release does not bar a child's cause of action.12
The court based its second holding on two factors. First, in many
jurisdictions, including Washington, parents cannot release their chil-
dren's existing claims without either judicial or statutory authority. 3
The court reasoned that to conclude that parents can release a child's
claim before but not after an injury would be illogical.14 Second, if
parents release a child's future claim, that child will have no recourse
if he suffers injuries and his parents cannot or will not pay the medical
bills. 1
II. THE SCOTT COURT DEPARTED FROM WASHINGTON
PRECEDENT, ADOPTING AN ERRONEOUS
APPROACH TO EXPRESS ASSUMPTION OF
RISK
By invalidating the parental release on public policy grounds, the
Scott court reached a result inconsistent with Washington precedent
and created potential confusion and uncertainty for future public pol-
icy determinations. Under Washington law, a valid express assump-
tion of risk such as the release in the Grayson Connor application
completely bars a plaintiff's claim unless it violates public policy.
Only four years prior to Scott, the Washington Supreme Court
adopted a multifactored analysis to determine whether an express
assumption of risk violates public policy. The release in Scott, how-
ever, did not contain enough of the articulated factors to violate public
policy under this analysis, and therefore should have barred Justin's
claim against the ski school.
10. Id. at 490, 834 P.2d at 9. While acknowledging that courts strictly construe such releases,
the court noted that under Washington law, releases need not specifically refer to negligence so
long as they use clear and unambiguous language. Id. at 490, 834 P.2d at 9-10.
11. Id. at 495, 834 P.2d at 12.
12. Id. The court also held, however, that an otherwise valid release could bar the parents'
independent claim based on the injury to their child. Id.
13. Id. at 494, 834 P.2d at 11; see infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
14. Scott, 119 Wash. 2d at 494, 834 P.2d at 11-12.
15. Id. at 494, 834 P.2d at 12. While the court acknowledged that disallowing parental
preinjury releases might increase the cost of children's sports, it considered this an insufficient
reason to uphold such releases. Id. at 495, 834 P.2d at 12.
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A. Express Assumption of Risk as a Bar to Recovery
The defense of assumption of risk limits or eliminates the duty that
a potential defendant otherwise owes to a potential plaintiff. Gener-
ally, a plaintiff cannot recover damages where that plaintiff voluntarily
assumes the risk that another person's negligence may cause harm and
such harm occurs.1 6 This doctrine developed relatively late in the
common law, 7 and for years courts applied it in a confusing and often
inconsistent manner to limit or deny recovery in a variety of situa-
tions. 8 Gradually, courts refined the doctrine and established several
different categories of assumption of risk. 9
One such category is express assumption of risk. An express
assumption of risk consists of an agreement between two parties in
which one expressly accepts the risk of injury caused by the other's
negligence.2' Such an agreement thus frees a potential defendant from
the duty of care that she would otherwise owe to a potential plaintiff.21
This voluntary shifting of legal responsibility prevents a plaintiff from
recovering damages for injuries caused by a negligent defendant.22
Courts make exceptions to this rule, however. Washington courts
in particular place four general limitations on express assumptions of
risk. First, releases must be conspicuous enough to prevent people
from unwittingly signing them.23 Second, Washington courts strictly
construe preinjury releases and demand that they unambiguously indi-
cate the parties' intent to shift the risk of negligence.24 Third, releases
cannot eliminate liability for negligent conduct falling greatly below
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). To assert the defense successfully,
the defendant must prove that the plaintiff (1) knew of the risk, (2) understood its nature, and (3)
voluntarily chose to incur it. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER ANI, KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 68, at 487 (5th ed. 1984).
17. KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 68, at 480.
18. Id.; see John L. Diamond, Assumption of Risk After Comparative Negligence: Integrating
Contract Theory into Tort Doctrine, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 717, 717 n.1 (1991).
19. Courts commonly accept four types of assumption of risk: e.press, implied primary,
implied reasonable, and implied unreasonable. KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 68, at 496-98.
These four differ in the amount of risk assumed and in whether they merely limit or totally bar a
plaintiff's recovery. Id. This Note addresses only parental preinjury releases, a subset of express
assumption of risk.
20. Id. at 480.
21. Id. at 496.
22. Id.
23. Hewitt v. Miller, I1 Wash. App. 72, 78, 521 P.2d 244, 247, review denied, 84 Wash. 2d
1007 (1974).
24. Scott v. Pacific W. Mountain Resort, 119 Wash. 2d 484, 490, 834 P.2d 6, 9 (1992); see
Hewitt, 11 Wash. App. at 79, 521 P.2d at 248. However, the release need not necessarily contain
the word "negligence." Scott, 119 Wash. 2d at 490, 834 P.2d at 10; Hewitt, 11 Wash. App. at 79,
521 P.2d at 248.
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the standard established by law for the protection of others.25
Finally, courts will void otherwise valid releases that violate public
policy.2
6
The document Mrs. Scott signed constituted an express assumption
of risk. The application contained a written release, and by signing it,
Mrs. Scott accepted the risk that the ski school would negligently
injure Justin and consequently accepted the financial responsibility for
Justin's care. The Washington Supreme Court had previously noted
that such releases are express assumptions of risk.27 Moreover, the
Scott court determined that this release was valid as written; it was
conspicuous and clearly written, and the Scotts did not allege that the
ski school was grossly negligent. 28 Nevertheless, the court refused to
enforce the release against Justin on the grounds that it violated public
policy.2 9
B. Washington's Public Policy Exception: The Wagenblast Analysis
Although Washington courts have continually refused to enforce
releases that violate public policy, for many years they lacked a sys-
tematic approach to public policy determinations. Courts holding
releases void as against public policy drew that policy from several
different sources, including legislative intent, 0  common law
precepts, 3I and the specific facts of an individual case.32  When void-
ing releases in these cases, however, the courts did not go beyond
25. Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wash. App. 571, 574, 636 P.2d 492, 493 (1981),
review denied, 96 Wash. 2d 1027 (1982). Thus no one could contract out of liability for gross
negligence, defined as "a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1033 (6th ed. 1990).
26. Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 110 Wash. 2d 845, 848-52, 758 P.2d
968, 970-71 (1988).
27. Id. at 856, 758 P.2d at 974. The terminology in this area varies, and the documents
signed may be called releases, waivers, or exculpatory clauses, among other things. This Note
refers to them as releases.
28. Scott, 119 Wash. 2d at 490-92, 834 P.2d at 9-10.
29. Id. at 495, 834 P.2d at 12.
30. Thomas v. Housing Auth. of Bremerton, 71 Wash. 2d 69, 76-80, 426 P.2d 836, 841-43
(1967) (contract exempting housing authority from liability to tenants for negligence violates
legislative public policy goal of providing safe low-income housing).
31. McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 450, 486 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1971)
(release limiting private landlord's liability for negligent failure to maintain common areas
violates public policy because it contravenes common law rules of landlord-tenant liability).
32. Reeder v. Western Gas & Power Co., 42 Wash. 2d 542, 551, 256 P.2d 825, 830 (1953)
(although gas companies normally have no duty to inspect customers' pipes, enforcement of
contract disclaiming liability for failure to inspect violated public policy where the need for
inspection was readily apparent).
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examining the particular release at issue to discuss the larger issue of
what types of releases in general violate public policy.
Washington courts similarly failed to engage in extensive analysis
when upholding releases. For example, in Hewitt v. Miller,33 the court
upheld a release signed by a participant in a scuba diving class. The
court simply stated that it required little discussion to conclude that
scuba diving instruction does not involve a public duty. 4 Similarly, in
Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc.,35 the court upheld a release
signed by a participant in a mountaineering expedition. The opinion
merely remarked that although mountaineering is a popular sport in
Washington, it does not involve a public interest.36
Recently, in Wagenblast v. Odessa School District No. 105-157-
166J,17 the Washington Supreme Court clarified the analysis to be
used when determining whether a release violates public policy. In
Wagenblast, the defendant school districts required the plaintiffs, pub-
lic school students and their parents, to sign releases before the stu-
dents could participate in school athletic prograns.3s Recognizing
that Washington courts lacked a clear method for determining
whether or not specific releases violate public policy, the Wagenblast
court adopted a multifactored public policy analysis to clarify matters.
The court then held that agreements releasing school districts from the
consequences of their future negligence violate public policy. 9
The analysis adopted by the Wagenblast court identified six factors
commonly present in releases which violate public pclicy. The validity
of a release depends on whether (1) the release concerns an activity
thought suitable for public regulation; (2) the party seeking to enforce
the release provides a service of great public importance, often one of
practical necessity; (3) that party provides the service to anyone meet-
ing certain established standards; (4) the party seeking the release pos-
sesses greater bargaining strength than those seeking the service; (5)
the release consists of a standardized adhesion contract; and (6) the
party providing the service has control over the person or property of
those seeking the service.' Although a court need not find all of these
factors to invalidate a release, the court reasoned that the more factors
33. 11 Wash. App. 72, 79-80, 521 P.2d 244, 248, review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1007 (1974).
34. Id. at 74, 521 P.2d at 245.
35. 30 Wash. App. 571, 574, 636 P.2d 492, 493 (1981), review denied, 96 Wash. 2d 1027
(1982).
36. Id.
37. 110 Wash. 2d 845, 758 P.2d 968 (1988).
38. Id. at 847, 758 P.2d at 969.
39. Id. at 848, 758 P.2d at 970.
40. Id. at 852-56, 758 P.2d at 972-73.
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that appear in a given release, the more likely the release violates pub-
lic policy.41
The Wagenblast court found all six factors present in the releases
required by the school districts and concluded that the releases vio-
lated public policy.42 First, the court found that school sports are sub-
ject to extensive public regulation. State law, local school boards, and
the Washington Interscholastic Activities Association regulate every-
thing from eligibility standards to athletic awards.4 3
Next, the Wagenblast court concluded that public school sports pro-
vide important services to the public in general, and to students in
particular. Interscholastic athletics play an integral part in Washing-
ton's overall educational program, as evidenced by the significant
expenditure of time, effort, and money on school sports.' Interscho-
lastic athletics also provide a link between schools and the community
at large, and sports programs keep some students in school who might
otherwise drop out.4" Moreover, school districts make athletic pro-
grams widely available, and any student meeting skill and eligibility
requirements can participate.46
The court further concluded that the school districts possessed
greater bargaining strength than the students and their parents and
that the releases constituted adhesion contracts. Students and their
parents have limited choices, given the dearth of alternative organized
competitive sports programs.47 Even where private programs exist,
they lack the "inherent allure" of school sports and may be too expen-
sive for some students.48 The lack of alternatives, coupled with the
school districts' "unwavering policy" regarding releases,49 gave the
districts great bargaining strength. Thus, the required releases consti-
tuted adhesion contracts.5" Students and their parents had to sign the
releases or forego the opportunity to participate in school athletic pro-
grams. 1 Thus, they could not negotiate for better terms or more pro-
tection against negligence.5 2
41. Id. at 852, 758 P.2d at 971.
42. Id. at 856, 758 P.2d at 973.
43. Id. at 852-53, 758 P.2d at 972.
44. Id. at 853, 758 P.2d at 972.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 854, 758 P.2d at 973.
47. Id. at 855, 758 P.2d at 973.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. An adhesion contract is a standardized contract offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
without any opportunity to bargain. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990).
51. Wagenblast, 110 Wash. 2d at 855, 758 P.2d at 973.
52. Id.
463
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Finally, the court found that the school districts, exercised signifi-
cant control over student athletes. The court recognized that the duty
of care a school district owes to its students extends to students
engaged in interscholastic sports. 3 Thus students, while under the
supervision of school coaches, are subject to the risk that the school
district or its agent, the coach, will breach that duty.5 4 The students
remained under the close supervision and, consequently, the extensive
control of the school district."
C. Wagenblast Represents the Correct Approach to Public Policy
Determinations
In reaching its conclusion that parental preinjury releases violate
public policy, the Scott court failed to follow the precedent established
in Wagenblast. By failing to follow or to explain its departure from
the public policy analysis established by its own precedent, the court
abrogated its responsibility to provide clarity and guidance for lower
courts. Had the court applied the Wagenblast analysis, it likely would
have concluded that the Grayson Connor release did not violate public
policy.
1. Public Policy Determinations Demand Clarity and Consistency
Public policy, although often invoked by courts as a basis for legal
decisions, is often a poorly defined and ambiguous concept.5 6 When
making a decision based on public policy, courts consider general
social interests.5 1 In the absence of a legislative or constitutional dec-
laration of policy, however, a court will depend largely on its own
sense of community values.58 Thus courts risk using "public policy"
as a basis to pursue their individual views of morality.59 The courts
therefore bear a special responsibility to analyze public policy deci-
sions carefully because of their unavoidable subjectivity.
Careful and consistent public policy analysis serves several pur-
poses. First, policy determinations serve as the legal basis for future
decisions. Thus, courts essentially create policy as they adjudicate;
53. Id. at 856, 758 P.2d at 973.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See generally Robert F. Brachtenbach, Public Policy in Judicial Decisions, 21 GONz. L.
REV. 1 (1985-86); James D. Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37
BROOK. L. REV. 323 (1971).
57. Hopkins, supra note 56, at 323.
58. Id. at 330-31.
59. Id. at 324.
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courts cite public policy to support their decisions, and those very
decisions in turn help to define the policies that later courts invoke.
Courts thus have a responsibility to clearly define both the public poli-
cies that their decisions serve and the principles on which those poli-
cies are based.' Such clarity not only helps future courts make
consistent decisions, but it also helps the general public. Court state-
ments of policy often affect individual conduct and choices." If courts
make unclear or inconsistent decisions, people will have difficulty pre-
dicting the legality of their behavior. Finally, requiring courts to
engage in and articulate a careful analysis will force courts to fully
consider the basis for their decisions. Otherwise, courts may all too
easily hide uncertain reasoning under the rubric of public policy.62
2. The Scott Court's Equivocal Treatment of Wagenblast Causes
Confusion
The Scott court tacitly retreated from the Wagenblast approach by
concluding that parents can never sign releases for their children,
rather than considering the nature of ski schools and the circum-
stances in which Mrs. Scott signed the release.6 3 The Wagenblast
court provided a well-reasoned approach to cases involving preinjury
releases. It considered several significant factors and concluded that
the school district releases violated public policy due to the essential
nature of the activity and the unequal bargaining strength of the par-
ties.64 Although it could have reached its decision on the same basis
as the Scott court-both parties in Wagenblast briefed the issue of
parental power to sign releases 6 5-- the Wagenblast court instead took
the opportunity to clarify public policy determinations in cases involv-
ing preinjury releases. It established an analysis that evaluates releases
in context, examining the particulars of each transaction, rather than
making a blanket rule that certain types of releases are always valid or
60. Brachtenbach, supra note 56, at 17.
61. Hopkins, supra note 56, at 331.
62. Id. at 333.
63. One author has argued that although Washington courts prior to Wagenblast analyzed
releases inconsistently, they actually reached consistent results because courts always considered
the practical public importance of an activity when deciding whether to uphold a release. Note,
School Districts Cannot Contract Out of Negligence Liability in Interscholastic Athletics, 102
HArM. L. REv. 729, 734 (1989). Even under this theory, the Scott court's reasoning fails,
because ski racing lessons are not of public importance. See infra note 70.
64. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
65. Brief of Appellants at 26-28, Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 110
Wash. 2d 845, 758 P.2d 968 (1988) (No. 53627-9); Brief of Respondents at 9-11, Wagenblast
(No. 53627-9).
465
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never valid.66 By failing to apply the Wagenblast analysis in Scott, the
Washington Supreme Court undermined its own goal to establish a
consistent approach to public policy determinations.
Moreover, although the Scott court distinguished vagenblast, it did
so by questionable reasoning. The Scott court simply stated that
Wagenblast did not apply because the Wagenblast court decided a dif-
ferent issue.6 7 Such reasoning implies that Wagenblast applies only to
releases required by public schools, and thus ignores the Wagenblast
court's intention to promote consistency, establish an approach that
would apply to all releases, and provide the guidance lacking in previ-
ous public policy holdings. Such an analysis is meaningless, however,
if, as in Scott, subsequent courts disregard it any time the facts do not
precisely parallel the original case. The Scott court, therefore, should
have applied the Wagenblast test.
If the Scott court intended to abandon or to qualify Wagenblast, it
should have done so explicitly. The Scott court was free to create a
reasoned exception to the Wagenblast analysis if it could not void the
ski school release under the multifactor test. It could have found that
other factors mitigated against upholding the release even though it
was valid under Wagenblast. By failing to provide a convincing expla-
nation for its decision not to apply the Wagenblast analysis, however,
the Scott court recreated the confusion in analyzing public policy
determinations that Wagenblast sought to resolve. Lower courts and
future litigants will find it increasingly difficult to determine which
releases are effective and which ineffective in terms of public policy.
3. Under Wagenblast the Release in Scott Is Effective
Under the Wagenblast analysis, the release that Mrs. Scott signed
was an effective release of her son's future cause of action against
Grayson Connor Ski School for his personal injuries. The majority of
the Wagenblast factors were absent in the circumstances surrounding
the Scott release. The release therefore was not void as against public
policy.
First, unlike public school athletic programs, private ski schools do
not operate under an extensive network of regulations. The Grayson
Connor Ski School is a private business that was operating at a pri-
66. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
67. Scott v. Pacific W. Mountain Resort, 119 Wash. 2d 484, 493, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (1992). The
Scott court notes that the Wagenblast court struck down the school dstrict releases on public
policy grounds without reaching the question of whether parents ma release their children's
future right to recover for a third party's negligence. Id.
466
Vol. 68:457, 1993
Invalidating Parental Preinjury Releases
vately owned resort.68 Thus, few state statutes or regulations govern
the school.69
Second, ski racing lessons do not constitute a practical necessity.
While discussing the public necessity of school sports, the Wagenblast
court specifically distinguished such activities from private recrea-
tional activities such as skydiving and mountain climbing.70 Despite
their great recreational value and appeal, skiing lessons are similarly
private and nonessential activities; they are not matters of public
necessity.
Third, ski school operators do not possess vastly greater bargaining
power than their patrons, given the nonessential and competitive
nature of the business of ski instruction. In the Northwest, numerous
ski schools compete with one another.71 Justin's parents were free to
send their son to any one of a number of ski schools if they objected to
the terms of the Grayson Connor Ski School application or if they
feared that Grayson Connor conducted his ski school unsafely. They
also had the option of hiring a private individual instructor. Thus,
Grayson Connor did not have the "near-monopoly power" that the
school districts possessed in Wagenblast.72
Fourth, the competitive nature of the business of ski instruction
counters the possibility that the release constituted an adhesion con-
tract. Unlike the plaintiffs in Wagenblast, who had to sign the releases
before the students could participate in school athletics, the Scotts did
not have to sign a release before Justin could ski because not all local
ski programs use identical releases. Some do not use any releases at
all.73 Competition among ski schools gives parents considerable bar-
gaining power; to successfully attract students, a ski school operator
must listen when potential customers complain about the terms of the
application. Therefore, although Grayson Connor Ski School, like the
school districts in Wagenblast, may well have had an "unwavering
68. Brief of Respondents Grayson Connor, Patricia Connor, and Grayson Connor Ski School
at 15-16, Scott (No. 57944-0) [hereinafter Grayson Connor brief].
69. Id. Although some Washington statutes do apply to skiing and commercial ski activity,
those statutes focus on the duties of ski area operators and patrons. The only reference to ski
schools requires them to maintain liability insurance if they operate a tramway. See WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 70.117.010-.040 (1992).
70. Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 110 Wash. 2d 845, 854 n.21, 758 P.2d
968, 972 n.21 (1988).
71. Grayson Connor brief, supra note 68, at 16. The 1992-93 Seattle Yellow Pages lists 19
local ski schools, and many ski areas have their own programs. Interview with Ruth Nielsen,
attorney for Grayson Connor, in Seattle, Wash. (Nov. 5, 1992) (notes on file with the Washington
Law Review).
72. Wagenblast, 110 Wash. 2d at 855, 758 P.2d at 973.
73. Interview with Ruth Nielsen, supra note 71.
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policy' 74 regarding its release, the release nonethele.s did not amount
to an adhesion contract.
Fifth, the control that ski school operators have over their custom-
ers does not compare to the control that school coaches have over
their students. Private instructors command less obedience from stu-
dents than do school coaches. Participants who pay for private
instruction can act more independently than members of a school
team. Private students who dislike the instruction of a given ski
school can refuse to participate in any particular activity which
appears dangerous. Those students could, however, most likely return
to the instruction at any time. On the other hand, a member of a
school football team who sits out a practice because he believes the
coach has not taken adequate safety precautions risks permanently los-
ing his place on the team. Thus, while the students at a ski school or a
public school may be subject to the supervision and guidance of the
instructor, public school coaches have the power to penalize students
who choose not to participate.
More significantly, because private instructors have less control over
their students, those instructors have limited ability to prevent stu-
dents from endangering themselves. School coaches control practice
sessions, equipment, and procedures; they have the power to govern
virtually everything a student does while engaged in athletics. They
also can invoke a disciplinary system and effectively deal with an
unruly student who may endanger himself or others.
Private ski instructors, however, do not operate under such circum-
stances. While they may have some initial control over the venue of
the activity, they have little control over student behavior. School
coaches have the power to prevent students from using athletic equip-
ment or facilities while unsupervised. A gym can be locked while not
in use; a slalom race course cannot. For example, in Scott, some evi-
dence indicated that Justin was injured while he was skiing
unsupervised and on his own initiative during a lunch break.75 Fur-
thermore, a paid instructor does not command the same disciplinary
authority over a customer as a school coach commands over his team
members. Thus, given the limited authority of its private instructors,
Grayson Connor Ski School had limited control over Justin.
While the foregoing Wagenblast factors were absent in Scott, the
activities at issue in Wagenblast and Scott do share one similarity: both
allow any qualified individual to participate. Any student who meets
74. Wagenblast, 110 Wash. 2d at 855, 758 P.2d at 973.
75. Grayson Connor brief, supra note 68, at 16-17.
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certain eligibility requirements can participate in school athletics, just
as anyone who attains a certain level of skiing skill can participate in
ski racing classes. Nonetheless, this represents only one factor of the
Wagenblast analysis. Moreover, Washington courts have upheld
releases for many recreational activities that allow anyone with the
requisite abilities to participate, including scuba diving and
mountaineering."' Making an activity widely available is thus not in
itself sufficient reason to invalidate releases for injuries suffered from
that activity.
The Grayson Connor Ski School release therefore should have
barred Justin's claims against the ski school. As a clearly written,
knowingly signed express assumption of risk, it is effective against
claims for ordinary negligence unless it violates public policy. Had the
court applied the multifactored analysis established by Wagenblast, it
would have found the release was not void as against public policy,
and would have upheld it against Justin's claim.
III. THE SCOTT COURT REACHED A DECISION
INCONSISTENT WITH PARENTS' ABILITY TO
CONTROL CHILDREN'S LITIGATION
The Scott court reached a decision inconsistent not only with Wash-
ington's approach to public policy analysis, but also with other areas
of Washington law. The court invalidated the parental preinjury
release partially due to the fear that such a release, if effective, might
prevent an injured child from recovering the money needed for medi-
cal care." Existing Washington laws, however, give parents the power
to prevent their injured children from recovering damages. Parents
control both the timing of a child's lawsuit and the substance of many
claims. As evidenced by its reasoning, however, the Scott court failed
to account for this element of Washington law.
A. Parents Decide Whether or Not to Pursue Their Children's
Claims
Washington law effectively gives parents the power to initiate their
children's litigation. Children under the age of eighteen cannot litigate
except through a guardian."8 While children over fourteen years old
may apply independently for a court-appointed guardian, a relative or
76. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
77. Scott v. Pacific W. Mountain Resort, 119 Wash. 2d 484, 494, 834 P.2d 6, 12 (1992).
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 12.04.140 (1992).
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friend must apply for children under fourteen years old. 9 If their par-
ents do not bring suit, children have only one opti.on: the statute of
limitations on most actions for negligence is tolled during minority,
and thus children can bring suit after they turn eighteen."0
The practical effect of Washington statutes undercuts the Scott
court's concern for injured children's inability to recover damages if
parents can release their children's future claims. The court failed to
acknowledge that because children cannot litigate on their own, par-
ents already possess the power to hamper their children's ability to
recover damages. Justin Scott in particular could not have brought
this lawsuit by himself. Because he was twelve years old when his
injuries occurred, he could not have sued independently or applied for
a court-appointed guardian."1 Although he could have waited and
sued when he turned eighteen, in the six-year interim he might have
suffered if his parents could not pay for his care. In practical terms,
his parents had the power to decide whether .he could recover
damages.
The Scott court either ignored or did not recognize the implications
of these existing Washington laws. The court did not question the
premise that parents control the pursuit of their children's litigation. 2
However, it failed to recognize that the practical effect of Washington
law undermines its conclusion that because preinjury releases would
prevent children from recovering damages such releases violate public
policy. A parent's decision not to sue on an existing claim can also
leave a child with no way to recover damages. While the tolling of the
statute of limitations preserves some claims, injured children may still
have to wait as long as eighteen years if a parent decides not to sue.
Thus, whether a parent decides not to sue before or after a claim
arises, the end result for the child is the same: the delay or elimination
of potential recovery. If a parent can decide not to sue on an existing
claim even though a child is left with no immediate recourse, a parent
should likewise be able to decide not to pursue an as-yet-nonexistent
claim, even if it might result in depriving an injured child of needed
resources.
79. Id. § 4.08.050.
80. Id. § 4.16.190.
81. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
82. See Scott v. Pacific W. Mountain Resort, 119 Wash. 2d 484, 493-94, 834 P.2d 6, 11
(1992).
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B. Parents Control Substantive Aspects of Their Children's Claims
Washington statutes enabling parents to eliminate substantive
aspects of their children's claims further undercut the reasoning of the
Scott court's decision. The Scott court expressed concern that
preinjury releases allow parents to terminate their child's right to
recover.8 3 While in some instances children whose parents do not ini-
tiate a lawsuit may have later opportunities to sue on their own,84
some Washington statutes nonetheless allow parents to permanently
eliminate part or all of their children's claims.
The Washington legislature has recognized that parents can make
binding decisions regarding their children's substantive rights. Partic-
ularly, where at least one parent consents to a medical procedure for a
child, neither the other parent nor the child can bring an action based
on lack of consent."5 Furthermore, in medical negligence actions the
parent's knowledge will be imputed to a child for purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations.8 6 This imputation supersedes the normal tolling of
the statute of limitations during a child's minority, 7 thus eliminating
potential claims whose statute of limitations runs out during that time.
The legislature enacted this provision as part of the 1986 tort reform
package, suggesting a recent legislative recognition that in certain situ-
ations other policies can outweigh the need to preserve children's
claims.88
The practical effect of these two pieces of legislation counters the
Scott court's assertion that parents should not be able to relinquish a
child's right to recover damages. Washington statutes allow parents
to do precisely that. A parent's consent to a medical procedure elimi-
nates a child's cause of action for battery.8 9 Furthermore, if a parent
knows that his child suffered injuries caused by medical negligence but
does nothing, that child's claim may vanish before the child can take
83. Id. at 494, 834 P.2d at 12.
84. See supra note 80.
85. WASH. Rv. CODE § 26.09.310 (1992).
86. Id. § 4.16.350. The statute of limitations on such actions requires that the plaintiff bring
an action within three years of the negligence complained of, or within one year of discovery of
the injury. IML
87. Id.
88. Act of Apr. 4, 1986, ch. 305, § 502, 1986 Wash. Laws 1361. The statute was apparently
designed to cut short the "long tail" of liability which previously left health care providers
potentially exposed for as long as 26 years if a child suffered injuries at birth. Charles K. Wiggins
et al., Washington's 1986 Tort Legislation and the State Constitution: Testing the Limits, 22
GONZ. L. REv. 193, 250 (1986-87).
89. Battery is often far easier to prove than negligence because the plaintiff need only show
that she was subjected to an intentional and unwanted physical contact. KEETON ET AL., supra
note 16, § 9, at 39-42.
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action herself.9" Whether by action or inaction, Washington parents
already effectively possess the power to relinquish some of their chil-
dren's claims. The Scott court's holding thus ignored this effect of
existing Washington law.
IV. THE SCOTT COURT FAILED TO ANALYZE THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRE- AND POST-CLAIM
PARENTAL MANAGEMENT
The Scott court incorrectly analogized parental release of a child's
future claim to parental management of a child's existing claim. The
Scott court concluded that because parents cannot settle children's
existing claims, parents should not have the power to waive future
claims.9 1 The Scott court erroneously equated the two situations.
Courts and legislatures require that courts approve parental settle-
ments of existing claims in order to protect children's property from
parental conflicts of interest. Whether motivated by need, greed, or
ignorance, a parent whose child has an existing tort claim has many
opportunities to act against his child's best interests. A parent's deci-
sion to waive a future claim, however, involves a situation with fewer
pressures on parents to act contrary to their children's long-term
interests.
A. Parental Management of Existing Claims: Courts Strive to
Protect Children's Property
Most jurisdictions, including Washington, accept the proposition
that parents cannot settle or release their children's existing tort
claims without judicial or statutory approval.92 Courts take this
responsibility seriously, refusing to merely rubber-stamp the settle-
ments presented to them.93 In Washington, a child's right to recover
for personal injuries is a property right.94 Court supervision aims to
protect that right. Parents cannot settle a child's claim without court
90. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
91. Scott v. Pacific W. Mountain Resort, 119 Wash. 2d 484, 494, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (1992).
92. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent & Child § 40 (1987); see infra notes S4-95 and accompanying
text.
93. Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1983) (court in which minor's
claims are litigated has duty to protect minor's interests and must independently investigate any
settlement recommended by a parent or guardian ad litem).
94. Hunter v. North Mason High Sch., 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P2d 845 (1975); see also
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Volpe, 284 F. 75 (3d Cir. 1922); Therriault v. Breton, 95 A. 699
(Me. 1915).
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approval, and a guardian ad litem or independent counsel must repre-
sent the child in any proceedings.95
A child's existing tort claim or recovery, although the child's prop-
erty, is vulnerable to parental control or mismanagement. When a
parent releases or settles a child's claim, a conflict of interest with the
child's rights may arise. For example, when a parent accepts a settle-
ment for a child's claim and signs an indemnity agreement, the parent
becomes liable to the defendant for any damages that the child recov-
ers.96 This creates a strong motive for the parent not to sue.97 Out-
right parental dishonesty may also threaten children's property; a
parent might squander or misappropriate a child's settlement or recov-
ery. 98 At times parents may also act ignorantly, or may be coerced or
defrauded into signing a release or settlement.99 For example, they
might release a claim hastily in the immediate aftermath of an acci-
dent." ° Parents coping with an injured child may be susceptible to
offers of a quick settlement. The emotional trauma and financial pres-
sure of the child's injury may compel the parents to agree to an imme-
diately attractive but ultimately inadequate settlement, or prevent
them from inquiring into terms that they normally would question.
Thus, absent court supervision, numerous parental actions can
threaten children's property rights in an existing tort claim or
recovery.
B. Parental Management of Existing Claims and Parental Waiver
of Future Claims Involve Different Considerations
The Scott court erroneously equated parental management of
existing claims with parental waiver of future claims.101 The concerns
95. 4A LEWIS H. ORLAND & KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE Rule 98.16W, at
51 (4th ed. 1990).
96. See, e.g., Loesch v. Vassiliades, 86 A.2d 14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952).
97. See Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mallison, 354 P.2d 800 (Or. 1960) (parent's fiduciary duty
to child not discharged by entering into agreement creating conflicting interests; child also may
be dissuaded from suing if he or she knows parents will ultimately pay recovery).
98. See, e.g., Colfer v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 519 A.2d 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)
(child's claim not barred where court had not approved settlement and father used funds for his
own expenses).
99. See, eg., Gordon v. Agaronian, 171 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) (release signed by
parents ineffective where parents were told by insurance company that they did not need an
attorney or court approval).
100. See, e.g., Wannemacher v. Tynan, 144 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) (release and
indemnity agreement not valid where executed by parents within ten days of accident and before
signs of injury appeared).
101. Several of the cases cited by the Scott court in support of its decision make the same
erroneous analogy between parental management of existing and future claims. See Doyle v.
Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 n.3 (Me. 1979) (parental preinjury releases invalid based
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underlying the judiciary's reluctance to allow parents to dispose of a
child's existing claim do not arise in the situation where a parent
waives a child's future claim. A parent dealing with an existing claim
is simultaneously coping with an injured child; such a situation creates
a potential for parental action contrary to that child's ultimate best
interests. 102
A parent who signs a release before her child participates in a recre-
ational activity, however, faces an entirely different situation. First,
such a parent has no financial motivation to sign th e release. To the
contrary, because a parent must pay for medical care, she risks her
financial interests by signing away the right to recover damages. Thus,
the parent would better serve her financial interests by refusing to sign
the release.
A parent who dishonestly or maliciously signs a preinjury release in
deliberate derogation of his child's best interests also seems unlikely.
Presumably parents sign future releases to enable their children to par-
ticipate in activities that the parents and children believe will be fun or
educational. Common sense suggests that while a parent might mis-
judge or act carelessly in signing a release, he would have no reason to
sign with malice aforethought.
Moreover, parents are less vulnerable to coercion and fraud in a
preinjury setting. 103 A parent who contemplates signing a release as a
prerequisite to her child's participation in some activity faces none of
the emotional trauma and financial pressures that raay arise with an
existing claim. That parent has time to examine the release, consider
its terms, and explore possible alternatives. A parent signing a future
release is thus more able to reasonably assess the possible conse-
quences of waiving the right to sue.
The facts of Scott demonstrated the conditions typically prevailing
when parents sign preinjury releases. Mrs. Scott signed the ski school
release to give Justin an opportunity to ski. She gained no financial
advantage for herself in doing so. She suffered no fraud or coercion.
She was under no financial or emotional pressure when she signed the
release. Thus, while she may have misjudged the risk to her son, Mrs.
Scott did not mismanage or misappropriate Justin's property. She did
on rule that parents or guardians cannot waive their children's existing claims); Childress v.
Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (release signed by mother before
son's participation in Special Olympics invalidated based on Tennessee rule requiring court
approval or statutory authority for settlement of a minor's claim).
102. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
103. While a parent might be defrauded in signing a preinjury release, courts could resolve
such situations individually rather than invalidating all parental preinjury releases.
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her best to protect Justin's interests, and the court need not step in to
do so.
Although the Scott court showed a laudable concern for injured
children's rights, it failed to analyze the differences between a parent's
management of an existing claim and a parent's waiver of a future
claim. The pitfalls inherent in parental management of an existing
claim make judicial supervision desirable. By contrast, fewer dangers
inhere in parental waiver of a future claim; consequently, courts
should defer to parental judgment when examining such waivers.
Therefore, by erroneously analogizing pre- and post-claim parental
management, the Scott court arrived at a faulty conclusion and an
unsatisfactory result.
V. CONCLUSION
In its desire to protect children's claims, the Scott court tacitly
abandoned Washington's approach to analyzing preinjury releases and
failed to acknowledge elements of Washington law that undermine its
reasoning. By failing to articulate a new public policy analysis for
preinjury releases or a narrow exception to the old one, the court
retreated into the confusion that earlier opinions sought to alleviate.
Moreover, the court's reasoning failed to account for existing law that
confers upon parents the power to delay or eliminate their children's
tort recoveries. Finally, the court mischaracterized preinjury releases
by analogizing them to parental management of a child's claim rather
than to a parent's decision not to sue at all.
The Scott court reached a flawed decision which threatens chil-
dren's organized recreational activities."° Such activities already suf-
fer from severe pressures. Increasing costs and the fear of litigation
threaten to drive recreational activities for children out of the mar-
ket.105 Given the virtues of and need for children's recreational pro-
grams,10 6 courts should do what they can to encourage such programs.
Because recreation providers will take care of their customers in order
104. Scott could also hurt Washington employers. In International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct 1196 (1991), the Supreme Court held that employers could not ban all
fertile women from jobs involving exposure to lead, even though lead exposure might cause birth
defects. Scott implies that employers could not obtain releases from female employees that would
be effective against claims brought by their future children. Thus, a Washington employer using
substances that might cause birth defects now faces long-term liability.
105. See generally Steven Findlay, Breaks of the Game, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 5,
1987, at 75; Lisa G. Markoff, A Volunteer's Thankless Task- Liability Threat Looms, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 19, 1988, at 1.
106. See generally Robert Scheer, Southern California Voices: A Forum for Community
Issues; Testimony/One Person's Story: Helping Kids on Skid Row; Nancy Berlin, L.A. TIMEs,
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to assure their continued patronage, validating releases that protect a
recreation provider would help to keep children's recreational pro-
grams available and affordable without diminishing the safety of such
programs.
476
Sept. 28, 1991, at B5; How to Enjoy Sports-And Avoid Injury, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec.
29, 1975, at 37.
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